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Empirical Article
People with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suffer 
from unintentional intrusive and distressing memories of 
the traumatic event. These unwanted memories have 
attracted much attention in the theorizing and research 
on PTSD. Much less is known about spontaneous memo-
ries for other, nontrauma, autobiographical events in 
PTSD. There is some evidence that recall of nontrauma 
autobiographical memories may be disturbed in PTSD. 
Case reports suggest that some trauma survivors may 
develop retrograde psychogenic amnesia for some life 
periods (Markowitsch, 2002). More commonly, patients 
with PTSD describe that they have completely changed 
as a person since the traumatic event and have difficulty 
remembering what they used to be like (e.g., Ehlers, 
Maercker, & Boos, 2000). They often report that sponta-
neous remembering is mostly restricted to memories of 
the traumatic event (e.g., Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 
2004). Laboratory studies found an overgeneral memory 
(OGM) bias in PTSD similar to that observed in depres-
sion (for reviews, see Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams 
et al., 2007), that is, a bias in intentional nontrauma mem-
ories. So far, it remains unclear whether there are system-
atic differences in spontaneous everyday nontrauma 
memories in traumatized people with and without PTSD. 
This introduction briefly describes the characteristics of 
intrusive, unintentional trauma memories and subse-
quently focuses on theories and research on nontrauma 
memories in PTSD.
Characteristics of trauma memories in 
PTSD
Intrusive, distressing, and unintentional memories of 
the  traumatic event are a hallmark symptom of PTSD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2013), and most 
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theories of PTSD focus on explaining their development 
and maintenance (e.g., Brewin, 2014; Brewin, Dalgleish, 
& Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1986). 
These theories convergently address clinical observations 
that intrusive trauma memories seem to appear unex-
pectedly, lack a time perspective, contain mostly sensory 
aspects of a situation, and are associated with intense 
emotional reactions and subsequent avoidance.
Trauma memories in PTSD have mainly been investi-
gated with retrospective questionnaires and interview 
assessments (e.g., Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 
2004; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005; Reynolds 
& Brewin, 1998, 1999; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, 
Ruths, & Clark, 2007), which restricts the ecological valid-
ity of the findings. Even though the literature on meta-
memory for naturally occurring events suggests that 
people’s retrospective judgments appear to be valid for 
salient and important events (Shlechter, Herrmann, & 
Toglia, 1990; but see Takarangi, Strange, & Lindsay, 2014, 
for conflicting findings), it would be desirable to obtain 
information on memories in people with PTSD as soon 
as possible after they occurred. A few studies have pro-
voked intrusive memories by either presenting trauma-
related pictures (Michael et al., 2005) or asking participants 
to give accounts of their trauma and to then subsequently 
identify flashback-like memories experienced during the 
narrative (Brewin, Huntley, & Whalley, 2012; Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2004; Whalley et al., 2013). These studies consis-
tently reported that intrusive trauma memories in PTSD 
are particularly vivid and predominantly consist of sen-
sory experiences, accompanied by high distress (e.g., 
Hackmann et  al., 2004; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004). A 
finding of theoretical interest was that intrusive memories 
of trauma in PTSD appear to lack time perspective, that 
is, by being experienced as rather present as in the past 
(“nowness”; e.g., Hackmann et  al., 2004; Hellawell & 
Brewin, 2004; Michael et al., 2005; Speckens et al., 2007). 
“Nowness” is seen as a central feature of memories of the 
worst moments during a trauma in cognitive models of 
PTSD (Brewin et  al., 1996; Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and is thought to 
result from a predominance of perceptual processing 
during trauma (Brewin, 2014; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; see 
also Kvavilashvili, 2014). The resulting memory is thought 
to be highly accessible by matching cues, poorly elabo-
rated, disjointed from other autobiographical informa-
tion, and retrieved with a lack of autonoetic awareness. 
There is some evidence that intentional retrieval of 
trauma memories is more disorganized in people with 
PTSD than those without PTSD (e.g., Halligan, Michael, 
Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, 
& Moritz, 2009). Berntsen and Rubin (2006) suggested 
that trauma memories are encoded as particular mean-
ingful landmark events that become central to people’s 
life story. However, the question of whether in PTSD 
trauma memories are stored and remembered in a dis-
tinct way remains a debate (see Kvavilashvili, 2014, for a 
discussion).
Few studies to date have recorded trauma memories 
in people with PTSD promptly after they occurred. In 
two daily diary studies of intrusive memories of negative 
life events in student populations (Berntsen, 2001; Rubin, 
Boals, & Berntsen, 2008), students with PTSD-like symp-
toms rated their trauma memories compared to non-
trauma memories as more vivid, as producing a worse 
mood and more physical reactions, and as more impor-
tant (Berntsen, 2001). Rubin et al. (2008) reported that 
PTSD symptoms were associated with an enhanced 
availability of memories for distressing events for both 
voluntary and involuntary retrieval (also Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2014). Based on these results these authors (Ber-
ntsen & Rubin, 2014; Rubin et  al., 2008) argued that 
intrusive remembering in PTSD might simply be 
explained by increased availability of the trauma mem-
ory due to general trait emotional reactivity to memories 
as a predisposing factor in vulnerable people. These 
authors predict differences between trauma and non-
trauma memories to be continuous and trauma memo-
ries to be intense in both individuals with and without 
PTSD symptoms. In accord with this, McKinnon et  al. 
(2014) found that enhanced memory for the trauma is 
not associated with symptoms of PTSD. However, these 
studies remain preliminary, as either they studied nega-
tive events that would not be considered traumatic 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2013) or results 
did not generalize when repeating subanalyses with 
traumatic events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2014), and PTSD 
symptoms were mild and were assessed by question-
naire only. Kleim, Graham, Bryant, and Ehlers (2013) 
used electronic diaries to compare unintentional trauma 
memories in people with and without PTSD. They found 
that for the PTSD group intrusive trauma memories 
appeared to happen in the here and now, and lead to 
stronger negative emotions such as fear or shame. Fur-
ther data from daily recordings of clearly defined trauma 
memories in reliably diagnosed individuals are needed 
to validate the differences found in questionnaire and 
interview studies between trauma survivors with and 
without PTSD. Second, studies are lacking that directly 
compare involuntary trauma and nontrauma memories 
in traumatized persons with PTSD.
Overgeneral memory bias in  
PTSD: Restricted to the laboratory 
or everyday problem?
Most studies of nontrauma autobiographical memories 
in  PTSD have investigated OGM bias. This is usually 
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assessed by applying the autobiographical memory test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), where OGM shows 
as a reduction in the proportion of specific memories 
retrieved intentionally after cue presentation. Trauma sur-
vivors with PTSD or acute stress disorder (ASD) showed 
less specific intentional autobiographical memory 
retrieval than those without PTSD or ASD in the AMT 
(Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; 
McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Nixon, Ball, 
Sterk, Best, & Beatty, 2013; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006; 
Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007; for reviews, 
see Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Ono, Devilly, & Shum, 2015). 
OGM in PTSD is found across different cultures (Graham, 
Herlihy, & Brewin, 2014; Humphries & Jobson, 2012; 
Jobson, Moradi, Rahimi-Movaghar, Conway, & Dalgleish, 
2014), and OGM assessed soon after trauma predicted 
subsequent PTSD and major depression at 6 months over 
and above initial diagnoses and symptom severity 
(Bryant, Sutherland, & Guthrie, 2007; Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008; but also see Hitchcock, Nixon, & Weber, 2014).
It is as yet unclear whether OGM in PTSD applies to 
spontaneous, unintentional memory retrieval in everyday 
life. The literature on autobiographical memory allows 
for different predictions. Unintentional memory retrieval 
is hypothesized to be a bottom-up process. This means 
that matching triggers may directly activate specific event 
representations (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The 
natural environment is rich in retrieval cues and direct 
retrieval may facilitate specific memories by bypassing 
retrieval on higher, abstract levels. In line with this sug-
gestion, Berntsen (1996) found in a diary study of healthy 
volunteers that spontaneously occurring autobiographi-
cal memories in everyday life were more specific than 
those retrieved intentionally in the laboratory (also 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; but see Rubin et  al., 
2008, for conflicting findings). Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, 
and Watkins (2013) compared the specificity of voluntary 
and involuntary autobiographical memories and poten-
tial interactions with depressive symptoms. Involuntary 
memories were more specific than voluntary memories. 
Nonremitted depressed participants showed reduced 
memory specificity for voluntary, but not for involuntary 
memories.
Those findings suggest that unintentional retrieval of 
autobiographical memories in PTSD may be unaffected 
by OGM bias, However, results of a study by Schönfeld 
and Ehlers (2006) cast doubts on this possibility. The 
authors used a pictorial version of the AMT, building on 
AMT research suggesting that imageability of cues and 
pictorial cues are associated with greater specificity 
(Belcher & Kangas, 2013; Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999), 
and found that OGM in PTSD generalized to pictorial 
cues.
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to suggest 
that OGM may apply to spontaneously occurring auto-
biographical memories in PTSD. The CaR-FA-X model 
(Williams et al., 2007) proposes that reduced executive 
functioning (X), rumination (R), capture (Ca), and func-
tional avoidance (FA) are the central mechanisms explain-
ing OGM in emotional disorders. The intentional search 
for specific memories in autobiographical memory 
retrieval is hypothesized to be a hierarchical, top-down 
process (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988) that, if aborted early, will result in an 
abstract general memory. Williams et al. (2006) suggested 
that rumination and abstract negative self-schemas may 
interfere with the retrieval of specific memories as people 
then get “captured” in abstract cognitions, such in as a 
“mnemonic interlock.” Similarly, the model suggests that 
retrieving general rather than specific memories reduces 
the emotional impact of remembering negative events, so 
that OGM may be functioning as an avoidance process in 
the face of adversity such as early trauma (i.e., Brennen 
et al., 2010; Crane et al., 2014; Ogle et al., 2013; Raes, 
Hermans, De Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003).
If OGM is linked to avoidance, several forms of cogni-
tive avoidance may reduce the likelihood with which 
people with PTSD remember specific autobiographical 
events in their everyday life. Suppression of trauma mem-
ories, rumination about the trauma, and persistent disso-
ciation have repeatedly been found to predict the 
persistence of PTSD (Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008; 
Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002) and are related to OGM 
in PTSD (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006; 
Wessel et al., 2014). Schönfeld et al. (2007) found that an 
experimentally induced intention to suppress trauma 
memories increased OGM in nontrauma memories. They 
suggested that this may represent a “misguided suppres-
sion effect” in that a rebound in trauma memories leads 
to further (unsuccessful) suppression attempts, which 
then (successfully but dysfunctionally) generalize to 
other memories via a vicious cycle. An observation made 
by Hulbert, Henson, and Anderson (2016) supports this 
view. They found that retrieval of other than the to-be-
suppressed material can be disturbed, potentially via dis-
rupted hippocampal activity. Dalgleish, Rolfe, Golden, 
Dunn, and Barnard (2008) found in a differentiating 
experiment that associations between OGM and PTSD 
are most likely explained by emotion regulation tenden-
cies (also see Bunnell & Greenhoot, 2012; Wessel et al., 
2014). It is interesting and contrary that Raymaekers, 
Smeets, Peters, and Merckelbach (2010) found that OGM 
did not differ in abused persons when comparing those 
with recovered versus continuous memories of their 
abuse; however, their sample had very low PTSD levels, 
so that the proposed mechanisms might not have applied.
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Nontrauma memories: Further 
potential autobiographical memory 
alterations in PTSD
Studies investigating memory problems in PTSD yielded 
mixed results; most reliably replicated is a deficit in ver-
bal memory (see Scott et al., 2015, for a review). There 
are very limited empirical data on autobiographical mem-
ory. McKinnon et al. (2014) found that for both trauma 
and nontrauma memories, people with PTSD retrieved 
more nonepisodic details of events than those without 
PTSD, but there were no differences in terms of richness 
or accuracy of nontrauma memories (see also Brown 
et al., 2014). Jelinek et al. (2009) found that nontrauma 
memory accuracy was related to trauma exposure rather 
than to PTSD symptoms. Blix and Brennen (2011) 
reported that trauma experience had no effect on the 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories. 
Mixed results were found for valence effects and mood 
bias in PTSD for laboratory-induced memories (see Amir, 
Leiner, & Bomyea, 2010; but Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-
Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000), and it is unclear whether 
they apply to spontaneous autobiographical memories.
Nontrauma memories and perceptions 
of the self
Traumatic experiences and subsequent symptoms may 
have profound effects on people’s sense of identity. Often 
the trauma is seen as a reference point in the person’s life 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and patients with PTSD have 
been described to be “frozen at the time” (Herman, 1992), 
“stuck” in the past (Holman & Silver, 1998), or “fixated to 
the time of the trauma” (McNally et al., 1995). It is thus 
possible that they have a bias in retrieving nontrauma 
memories that are nevertheless connected to the trauma. 
Furthermore, people with PTSD describe themselves as 
being permanently changed for the worse or feeling 
alienated from aspects of their life (Ehlers et al., 2000). 
Such changes in self-perception are most likely interwo-
ven with altered autobiographical remembering. Correla-
tional analyses suggested that OGM in PTSD is associated 
with perceived permanent change and dissociation 
(Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006). One 
may therefore expect that people with PTSD perceive 
spontaneous nontrauma memories as if they relate to a 
different self. Coping strategies such as persistent disso-
ciation, thought suppression, and rumination may pre-
vent individuals with PTSD from engaging with their 
everyday environment. This might contribute to the 
impression that their life is unreal (Halligan et al., 2003) 
and to a diminished encoding of new memories as well 
as a reduced spontaneous retrieval of stored autobio-
graphical events.
Aims of the study
The present study compared characteristics of naturally 
occurring autobiographical memories that traumatized 
people with and without PTSD experience in their every-
day lives. The study had two aims:
1. To investigate whether traumatized people with 
PTSD show deficits in the retrieval of nontrauma 
memories compared to traumatized people with-
out PTSD. We expected that people with PTSD 
would show a paucity of these memories, an 
OGM bias, and would experience these memories 
as distant from the self.
2. To investigate the characteristics of trauma memo-
ries in everyday life in people with PTSD. We 
expected that traumatized people with PTSD would 
experience more frequent trauma memories of 
greater vividness, nowness, and recurrent nature 
than those without PTSD. We also expected that 
people with PTSD would describe their trauma 
memories to a greater extent as landmark events in 
their biography than those without PTSD, and that 
they would try harder to suppress them and rumi-
nate more about them. We expected that within the 
PTSD group, trauma memories would differ from 
nontrauma memories on the same dimensions.
Method
Participants
All participants had experienced a traumatic event that 
met Stressor Criterion A of the fourth edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), that is, an 
event that involved actual threat of death or serious injury 
or physical integrity to self or others and the individual 
responded with intense fear or helplessness. Participants 
were recruited through local victim support organizations 
and emergency departments of local hospitals, via news-
paper advertisements, and through an outpatient specialist 
service for psychological treatment of anxiety disorders.
A total of 75 traumatized adults were assessed for the 
study. Exclusion criteria were head injury, psychosis, and 
drug abuse or dependence. People were also excluded if 
they had experienced more than one trauma within the 
past five years to avoid ambiguity in the temporal rela-
tionship between their memories in regard to the trauma. 
In all, 21 people were excluded for the following rea-
sons: drug abuse or dependence (n = 9), subthreshold 
PTSD (n = 6), psychosis (n = 2), multiple trauma (n = 2), 
failure to understand the diary instruction (n = 1), and 
inability to fill in the diary because of severe depression 
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(n = 1). Two people decided not to participate in the 
study as they found it too effortful to keep the diary. 
Thus, the final sample comprised 52 participants. The 
PTSD group comprised 26 participants who met the diag-
nostic criteria for PTSD as assessed with the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon, & Williams, 1995) and showed at least moderate 
PTSD symptom severity as indicated by a score of 17 or 
more on the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 
Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). Two participants with 
PTSD had comorbid panic disorder, 3 agoraphobia, 1 
social phobia, 3 specific phobia, 1 obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, 1 generalized anxiety disorder, 3 major depres-
sion, and 1 somatization disorder and hypochondriasis. 
Overall, 12 participants in the PTSD group had at least 
one comorbid Axis I disorder (46.2%).
The no-PTSD group comprised 26 participants who 
had experienced a traumatic event according to the DSM-
IV but did not fulfill the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and 
did not score higher than 13 on the PDS. Two partici-
pants in the control group had one comorbid Axis I dis-
order (7.7%), 1 social phobia, and 1 somatization disorder. 
Table 1 presents the sample characteristics. The groups 
did not differ in age, sex, ethnicity, education, or trauma 
characteristics. As to be expected, the PTSD group 
reported greater severity of symptoms of PTSD, depres-
sion, and anxiety, had more comorbid diagnoses, and 
had lower verbal intelligence as measured by the Mill Hill 
Vocabulary Scale (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1994).
Self-report measures
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS). The PDS 
(Foa et  al., 1997) is a standardized and validated self-
report measure of PTSD symptom severity that has been 
widely used with clinical and nonclinical samples of trau-
matized individuals. The PDS asks participants to rate 
how much they have been bothered in the past month 
by each of the PTSD symptoms specified in DSM-IV rang-
ing from 0 (never) to 3 (5 times per week or more/very 
severe/nearly always). Internal consistency (α) in the 
present sample was .95.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and Beck Anxi-
ety Inventories (BAI). The BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) 
and the BAI (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) 
assessed levels of depression and anxiety. Both instru-
ments are of established reliability and validity. Internal 
consistencies (α) in the present sample were .92 (BDI) 
and .94 (BAI).
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHV). The MHV (Raven 
et al., 1994) is a standard measure of verbal intelligence 
and asks participants to detect the correct synonym in a 
group of words. We administered Set A of the multiple-
choice version of the senior form.
Table 1 shows the group descriptives for the demo-
graphic and clinical measures
Autobiographical memory diary. Participants des-
cribed their autobiographical memories in a diary form 
for one week. Participants were asked to record all mem-
ories that appeared during this time and to give their 
ratings right after the memory occurred. The diary con-
sisted of separate paper sheets (“memory sheets”), and 
each sheet was used to describe a single memory. A pilot 
study with 8 healthy volunteers and 4 PTSD patients 
tested the acceptability and wording of the diary form 
and determined the number of questions that could be 
asked about each memory. The final diary form assessed 
the following information about each memory: Partici-
pants noted the date and time of occurrence of each 
memory and gave a brief description of its content. They 
then answered questions about five groups of memory 
characteristics.
Relationship between memories and trauma. Par-
ticipants indicated (a) whether the event had occurred 
before or after the traumatic event, or was the traumatic 
event, and (b) whether the content of the memory was 
related to the traumatic event.
Valence. Participants rated both the valence of the 
event and of the corresponding memory, on a scale from 
−5 (very unpleasant) to +5 (very pleasant).
Memory features. Participants reported (a) whether 
memory was intentional, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (very much), (b) how recurrent the memory was, on 
a scale from 0 (had never before) to 10 (have had very 
often), (c) how vivid the memory was, on a scale from 
0 (not at all) to 10 (very much), and (d) how temporally 
remote the memory appeared, on a scale from 0 (as if 
happening here and now) to 10 (long ago).
Relationship of memory and the self. Participants rated 
(a) the extent to which the memory felt the event had 
happened to the same person they felt to be now, on a 
scale from 0 (self different) to 10 (the same person), (b) 
how likely the participant felt that this memory would 
occur as the first memory when thinking of that life 
period (landmark event), on a scale from 0 (another one 
likely to come first) to 10 (this one likely to come first), 
and (c) whether the memory was related to an important 
life theme, on a scale from 0 (from not at all important 
theme) to 10 (very important).
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Reactions to memories. Participants reported (a) the 
extent to which they tried to push the memory out of 
their mind, on a scale from 0 (push out) to 10 (hold in 
mind), (b) how much time they spent thinking about 
the event after the memory occurred (not at all, a few 
seconds, about a minute, several minutes, 10 to 20 min-
utes, 20 minutes to an hour, and more than an hour), and 
(c) how many (if) connected memories they experienced 
(number to be written down). If a memory was followed 
by a “new” memory, a separate sheet was to be used and 
filled in.
The experimenter gave participants a few examples 
of autobiographical memories and gave detailed instruc-
tions on how to fill in the diary. Each item was explained 
and illustrated with an example. Participants were 
encouraged not to censor their memories, and told that 
when describing the content of a memory, they could 
use a description that revealed its meaning only to them. 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
Variable PTSDa No-PTSDa
Statistic for group 
comparison
Age in years, M (SD) 41.5 (11.7) 35.2 (12.1) F(1, 50) = 3.64, ns
Sex, n (%) χ2(1, n = 52) = 1.26, ns
 Female 13 (50.0) 17 (65.4)  
Ethnicity, n (%) χ2(2, n = 52) = 3.45, ns
 Black 7 (26.9) 2 (7.7) FI (n = 52) = 4.91, ns
 Caucasian 16 (61.5) 21 (80.8)  
 Other 3 (11.5) 3 (11.5)  
Marital status, n (%) χ2(3, n = 52) = 7.50, ns
 Single 7 (26.9) 12 (48.0)  
 In relationship 4 (15.4) 3 (12.0)  
 Married 9 (34.6) 10 (40.0)  
 Divorced/separated 6 (23.1) 0 (0.0)  
 Missing data 1  
Education, n (%) χ2(3, n = 52) = 6.04, ns
 None 1 (3.8) 1 (3.8)  
 Exams at age 16 (GCSE) 9 (34.6) 2 (7.7)  
 Exams at age 18 (A level or equivalent) 4 (15.4) 4 (15.4)  
 College or university 12 (46.2) 19 (73.1)  
Trauma, n (%) χ2(3, n = 52) = 1.37, ns
 Accidents 9 (34.6) 11 (42.3)  
 Interpersonal violence 11 (42.3) 8 (30.8)  
 Unexpected death of relative 3 (11.5) 2 (7.7)  
 Other 3 (11.5) 5 (19.2)  
Injuries, n (%) χ2(2, n = 52) = 2.70, ns
 No injuries 7 (26.9) 12 (46.2)  
 Minor injuries 11 (42.3) 10 (38.5)  
 Major injuries 8 (30.8) 4 (15.4)  
Time elapsed since trauma, n (%) χ2(3, n = 52) = 3.26, ns
 < 6 months 4 (15.4) 1 (3.8) FI (n = 52) = .396, ns
 < 1 year 8 (30.8) 7 (26.9)  
 < 2 years 7 (26.9) 6 (23.1)  
 < 5 years 7 (26.9) 12 (46.2)  
PTSD symptom severity (PDS), M (SD) 30.08 (7.67) 4.19 (4.09) F(1, 50) = 230.69***
Depression (BDI), M (SD) 20.35 (9.04) 4.04 (3.91) F(1, 50) = 71.23***
Anxiety (BAI), M (SD) 23.19 (12.22) 5.27 (4.33) F(1, 50) = 49.68***
Verbal Intelligence (MHV), M (SD) 19.00 (5.53) 23.42 (5.39) F(1, 50) = 8.53**
Note. BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; FI = Fisher’s exact test; MHV = Mill Hill 
Vocabulary Scale; ns = not significant; PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale.
an = 26.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Participants also received the instructions in written 
form.
Trauma memory estimation. Before keeping the 
diary, participants estimated what percentage of their 
everyday memories they expected to be trauma 
memories.
Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
Each participant gave written informed consent. Partici-
pants were then instructed in the usage of the memory 
sheet either over the telephone or in person, depending 
on their preference. They were given or sent the written 
instructions and memory sheets and rated the percentage 
of trauma memories expected for the diary week. After a 
week of recording, the participant attended a research 
session. The session started with an AMT (the results of 
which are presented in Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006). The 
experimenter then systematically interviewed the partici-
pant about each memory entry in the diary, for each 
sheet respectively. This clarified whether the description 
was of an actual memory, helped determine the memo-
ry’s specificity, and clarified other open ratings or further 
questions. The session then continued with the MHV, 
symptom questionnaires, trauma interview, and the SCID. 
The participants were debriefed about the purpose of the 
study and received on average £35 as reimbursement for 
travel expenses and their time.
Data analysis
Only diary entries that were clearly recognizable as mem-
ories were included in the analysis; therefore, thoughts 
and descriptions of current states, future worries, or pro-
spective memories such as “I have to remember to take 
my medication” were excluded. As not all participants 
reported trauma memories in the diary, nontrauma and 
trauma memories were analyzed separately. Most memo-
ries were rated as unintentional. We first conducted sepa-
rate analyses for all memories and unintentional 
memories only (operationalized as a rating less than 6 on 
the intentional scale). The results were the same except 
that group differences were more pronounced when the 
analysis was restricted to unintentional memories. For 
parsimony, we present only the results of the more con-
servative analysis using all memories.
Nontrauma memories were coded for specificity fol-
lowing Williams and Broadbent (1986). A memory was 
defined as specific if it was about “an event lasting a day 
or less, which occurred at a certain place and time even 
if the subject could not remember when,” as extended if 
it was about “an event lasting longer than a day,” and as 
general if the memory “reflected repeated activities” or if 
they were general memories about people or places. A 
random sample of 5% of the answers (n = 35) was rated 
by an independent second rater, who was blind to the 
diagnosis. Interrater reliability (κ) was .94.
Groups of related variables were analyzed with 
MANOVA, followed by univariate tests if the overall test 
was significant. Other variables were analyzed with ANO-
VAs. For variables correlating with MHV, we also tested 
whether the group difference remained significant if 
MHV was statistically controlled by ANCOVA. Frequen-
cies of memories were log transformed and trauma-relat-
edness of memories square root transformed to normalize 
the distribution. To avoid distortions resulting from single 
memories for variables representing percentages of non-
trauma memories (OGM, relationship to trauma), we 
included in the analysis of these variables only partici-
pants who had more than one nontrauma memory (n = 
23 with PTSD, n = 26 without PTSD). The GLM proce-
dure in SPSS 23 was used for data analyses. Significance 
levels were set at p < .05.
Results
Number of memories
Before starting the diary, the PTSD group predicted that 
a greater proportion of their everyday autobiographical 
memories would be trauma memories than the no-PTSD 
group, M = 52.7% (SD = 26.5%) versus M = 7.7% (SD = 
11.7%), F(1, 49) = 62.36, p < .001, partial η2 = .560. The 
group difference remained significant when MHV was 
controlled for, p < .001. The predicted proportion of 
trauma memories correlated with the actual proportions 
recorded in the diary, r = .57, p < .001.
In the diary, the PTSD group reported a mean of 11.0 
memories (SD = 7.6), and the no-PTSD group a mean of 
21.4 memories (SD = 18.6), F(1, 50) = 8.031, p = .007, 
partial η2 = .138. All participants recorded at least one 
nontrauma memory, and 21 of the PTSD group and 16 of 
the no-PTSD group recorded at least one trauma memory 
in the diary. An ANOVA with the between-subject factor 
group (PTSD vs. no-PTSD) and within-subject factor 
memory type (trauma vs. nontrauma) showed a signifi-
cant interaction, F(1, 50) = 44.35, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.470. Post hoc tests showed that the PTSD group reported 
fewer nontrauma memories, F(1, 50) = 18.06, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .265, but more trauma memories than the no-
PTSD group, F(1, 50) = 11.07, p = .002), partial η2 = .181. 
MHV scores did not correlate with any of the frequency 
variables, all rs –.10 < r < .10.
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Characteristics of nontrauma 
memories
Overgeneral memory. The percentage of nontrauma 
memories that were classified as specific, general, or 
extended is shown in Table 2. The MANOVA showed a 
significant group difference, F(2, 46) = 3.96, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .147. The PTSD group reported fewer spe-
cific, F(1, 47) = 7.91, p = .007, partial η2 = .144, and more 
general memories in the diary than the no-PTSD group, 
F(1, 47) = 7.70, p = .008, partial η2 = .141. Group differ-
ences remained significant when MHV scores and age of 
memories were controlled by ANCOVA.
Valence and relationship to trauma. Table 2 shows 
the characteristics of the nontrauma memories reported 
by the groups. There were no group differences in the 
valence of the events or the memories of them, F(2, 49) = 
2.10, p = .133, partial η2 = .079. The MANOVA showed a 
significant group difference in the temporal relationship 
between the nontrauma memories and the trauma, 
F(3, 45) = 13.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .477. The PTSD 
group recalled fewer memories from after the trauma, 
F(1, 47) = 8.05, p = .007, partial η2 = .146, more memories 
from before the trauma, F(1, 47) = 6.76, p = .012, partial η2 = .126, and rated a higher proportion of their memo-
ries as trauma-related than in the no-PTSD group, F(1, 
47) = 23.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .329.
Memory features. There was a trend for a group differ-
ence regarding the memory features, F(4, 47) = 2.31, p = 
.072, partial η2 = .164. The PTSD group reported that 
their nontrauma memories were more vivid than the no-
PTSD group, F(1, 50) = 8.65, p = .005, partial η2 = .147.
Memory and self. Both groups differed regarding the 
self-related memory variables, F(3, 48) = 4.72, p = .006, 
partial η2 = .228. The PTSD group reported to feel less 
that they were the same self as in the memory than the 
no-PTSD group, F(1, 50) = 5.22, p = .027, partial η2 = .094, 
and rated their memories as related to more important life 
themes, F(1, 50) = 7.12, p = .010, partial η2 = .125.
Table 2. Characteristics of Everyday Nontrauma Memories for the PTSD and 
No-PTSD Groups: Means and Standard Deviations
PTSDa No-PTSDa
Variable M SD M SD
Total number of memories (n) 7.77 6.23 20.42 17.98
Memory specificity (%)  
 Specific 50.31b 29.36 70.61 20.92
 General 43.80b 32.20 23.24 18.64
 Extended 5.89b 11.32 6.15 7.47
Relation to trauma (%)  
 Before trauma 64.91b 28.39 45.39 24.17
 After trauma 31.20b 26.36 51.36 23.14
 Content related to trauma 26.21b 25.88 3.57 6.47
Valence (–5 to +5)  
 Event 1.22 2.56 0.82 1.59
 Memory 0.66 2.49 0.82 1.24
Memory features (0–10)  
 Intentional 3.18 2.51 3.05 1.93
 Recurrent 4.27 2.42 3.73 1.48
 Vivid 7.55 1.96 6.15 1.42
 Remote: Here & now (0) to long ago (10) 5.33 2.32 5.89 1.23
Memory and self (0–10)  
 Self: Different (0) to same (10) 5.41 2.60 6.80 1.70
 Landmark event 3.50 2.05 3.85 1.47
 Important life theme 6.58 2.61 4.77 2.29
Reactions to memory (0–10)  
 Suppression (0) to holding in mind (10) 6.56 3.37 5.48 1.11
 Dwelling 3.85 1.16 3.17 0.79
 No. of connected memories 1.45 1.27 0.84 0.88
an = 26, if not otherwise specified. bn = 23, as at least two memories were required for 
percentages.
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Reactions to memories. Participants with PTSD dif-
fered from those without PTSD in their reactions toward 
nontrauma memories, F(3, 48) = 2.98, p < .042, partial η2  = .157. They spent more time thinking about the 
memory than those without PTSD, F(1, 50) = 5.92, p = 
.017, partial η2 = .108, and reported a higher number of 
connected memories, F(1, 50) = 4.08, p = .05, partial η2 = .075.
Characteristics of trauma memories
Characteristics of the trauma memories reported in the 
diary are shown in Table 3.
Valence. The MANOVA indicated a group difference in 
valence, F(2, 33) = 7.96, p = .002, partial η2 = .325. The 
PTSD group rated both their traumatic event, F(1, 34) = 
5.55, p = .024, partial η2 = .149, and the trauma memories 
as more negative, F(1, 34) = 12.58, p = .001, partial η2 = 
.270, than the no-PTSD group.
Memory features. The groups differed in reported 
trauma memories features, F(4, 30) = 9.60, p = .001, par-
tial η2 = .561. The PTSD group rated their trauma memo-
ries as more recurrent, F(1, 34) = 8.62, p = .006, partial η2 = .202, vivid, F(1, 34) = 10.60, p = .003, partial η2 = 
.238, and to a greater extent as appearing to happen in 
the present, F(1, 34) = 35.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .508, 
compared to the no-PTSD group. There were no group 
differences in whether or not the trauma memories were 
experienced as unintentional.
Trauma memories and self. There were no significant 
group differences, but there were trends for the PTSD 
group to report a greater landmark quality of their trauma 
memories, F(1, 33) = 3.55, p = .069, partial η2 = .097, and 
to report them as more related to important life themes, 
F(1, 32) = 3.61, p = .067, partial η2 = .101.
Responses to trauma memories. The groups differed 
in terms of their responses toward trauma memories, F(1, 
30) = 7.68, p = .001, partial η2 = .434. The PTSD group 
reported that they made more efforts to suppress the 
memories, F(1, 34) = 4.63, p = .039, partial η2 = .120, and 
dwelled longer on them, F(1, 34) = 15.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .307.
Trauma versus nontrauma memories 
in the PTSD group
The overall test revealed differences in pleasantness rat-
ings between trauma and nontrauma memories, F(2, 
19) = 57.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .859, event rating F(1, 
20) = 90.46, p < .001, partial η2 = .819, memory rating, 
F(1, 20) = 121.45, p < .001, partial η2 = .859. Memories 
also differed in their features, F(4, 16) = 689.10, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .994. Trauma memories were more frequently 
recurring, F(1, 20) = 30.11, p < .001, partial η2 = .601, less 
Table 3. Characteristics of Everyday Trauma Memories for the PTSD and 
No-PTSD Groups: Means and Standard Deviations
PTSDa No-PTSDb
Variable M SD M SD
Total number of memories (n) 3.23 3.71 0.96 1.15
Valence (–5 to +5)  
 Event –4.66 0.54 –3.55c 2.08
 Memory –4.39 1.15 –2.57c 1.92
Memory features (0–10)  
 Intentional 1.35 1.88 2.13c 2.70
 Recurrent 8.65 1.83 6.60 2.37
 Vivid 8.37 2.24 5.57 2.92
 Remote: Here & now (0) to long ago (10) 2.50 1.74 6.23 2.03
Memory and self (0–10)  
 Self: Different (0) to same (10) 5.50 3.66 5.03 3.79
 Landmark event 7.58 2.39 5.94d 2.74
 Important life theme 6.95e 4.01 4.29c 4.12
Reactions to memory (0–10)  
 Suppression (0) to holding in mind (10) 2.05 2.44 3.72c 2.11
 Dwelling 4.40 1.08 3.08c 0.92
 No. of connected memories 1.49f 1.18 0.93d 0.99
an = 21; bn = 16; cn = 15; dn = 14; en = 19; fn = 20.
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intentional, F(1, 19) = 11.91, p = .003, partial η2 = .385, 
more vivid, F(1, 20) = 15.80, p = .001, partial η2 = .441, 
and more experienced as happening in the here and 
now, F(1, 20) = 32.25, p < .001, partial η2 = .617. Regard-
ing self-relatedness, F(3, 16) = 102.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .950, they were rated as more a landmark event, F(1, 
20) = 45.95, p < .001, partial η2 = .697; however, there 
were no differences in the other variables of this cate-
gory. Participants’ reactions to trauma memories differed 
from those toward their nontrauma memories, F(3, 18) = 
206.04, p < .001, partial η2 = .972. They thought longer 
about them, F(1, 20) = 8.19, p < .02, partial η2 = .291, sup-
pressed them more, F(1, 20) = 18.26, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.482, and indicated having more connected memories, 
F(1, 20) = 7.33, p < .02, partial η2 = .268.
Discussion
The present study was to our knowledge the first to com-
pare everyday nontrauma autobiographical memories in 
traumatized people who met diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
compared to those without PTSD. It is also one of the 
few studies investigating features of everyday trauma 
memories in traumatized persons with and without PTSD 
with concurrent recordings. No other study to our knowl-
edge using these methods allowed comparisons between 
both memory types within a group of persons with PTSD.
Overgeneral memory retrieval in 
everyday life
In line with laboratory research showing an OGM bias in 
PTSD (see reviews by Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Ono et al., 
2015), the nontrauma memories retrieved by the PTSD 
group were less specific and more general than those of 
the no-PTSD group. Thus, the present study extended the 
finding of OGM to everyday memories, including unin-
tentional remembering.
OGM in PTSD thus appears to be independent of 
retrieval conditions. This is in line with our prior finding of 
OGM in PTSD when pictorial cues were used (Schönfeld 
& Ehlers, 2006). The pattern of findings suggests that 
access to specific memories is impaired in PTSD and that 
direct retrieval does not overrule this memory bias. This 
effect remained significant when controlling for differ-
ences in verbal intelligence and age of memories. To our 
knowledge, the only study to date investigating OGM in 
involuntary memories found OGM for voluntary but not 
for involuntary memories in patients with depression 
(Watson et al., 2013). Further studies are needed to clarify 
the difference in findings for OGM for involuntary mem-
ories between PTSD and depression.
The pattern of findings supported the rumination, cap-
ture, and avoidance hypotheses of OGM (Williams et al., 
2007). Overgeneral retrieval as an abstract remembering 
style may mirror rumination as an abstract thinking style, 
both of which are related to PTSD. The PTSD group 
thought longer about their nontrauma memories and 
reported more connected memories than the no-PTSD 
group, suggesting that spontaneous memories triggered 
ruminative thought processes and further memories that 
were thematically linked (see Mace, 2014, for a theoreti-
cal discussion of memory chains). It should be noted, 
however, that the groups did not differ in the suppression 
of nontrauma memories. However, as Schönfeld et  al. 
(2007) argued, it is possible that a repeated suppression 
of trauma memories might bring about suppression of 
other memories (“misguided suppression”; see also 
Hulbert et al., 2016).
An alternative explanation for OGM in everyday life 
could be that participants with PTSD are less aware of 
their environment and thus process cues that may trigger 
specific memories less efficiently than people without 
PTSD. Their general memories may have been mainly 
triggered by abstract internal cues, such as ruminative 
thoughts.
Impoverished nontrauma memory 
retrieval in PTSD
The deficit in nontrauma memory recall in PTSD appeared 
to go beyond OGM in that traumatized people with PTSD 
recorded fewer nontrauma autobiographical memories in 
their everyday life than traumatized people without 
PTSD, and this was not explained by verbal memory defi-
cits. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of these mem-
ories were related to the trauma. The PTSD group further 
showed a predominance of memories from the time 
before the trauma, and had fewer recent memories than 
the no-PTSD group (for different findings see Blix & 
Brennen, 2011). Thus, the pattern of results for the PTSD 
group deviates from the usual forgetting function (Ebb-
inghaus, 1885; Rubin, 1982), which in uncued autobio-
graphical remembering in healthy individuals is also 
hypothesized to be invariant across different time scales 
(Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001; Moreton & Ward, 2010). 
A low retention of recent memories in PTSD may inter-
fere with everyday functioning in that the ability to 
remember recent events may be necessary when adjust-
ing to current task needs, such as problem solving 
(Anderson & Schooler, 1991; Berntsen, 1996). It might 
also interfere with contextualizing and “updating” trauma 
memories in that the person fails to process that nontrau-
matic, positive events after the trauma are also part of the 
biography, adding to a feeling of being permanently 
changed by the trauma (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). Further-
more, in PTSD, despite being pretraumatic, those memo-
ries were nevertheless rated as related to the trauma, 
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supporting the potential role of the trauma as a landmark 
event when thinking of other events retrospectively or 
the role of appraisals of significant change caused by the 
trauma. At this stage it is not possible, however, to dif-
ferentiate whether the low recall of recent events in PTSD 
reflects a problem in retrieval or a problem in encoding.
Other group differences in memories 
of nontraumatic events
People with PTSD reported that their nontrauma memo-
ries felt as if they happened to a different person and 
reported more frequently that the memory reflected an 
important life theme. Together with ruminative remem-
bering style, the pattern of findings resembles those of a 
study by Teasdale and Green (2004), who found that 
ruminative and neurotic self-focus were linked to memo-
ries being experienced as “not at all at-one with things.” 
The authors see this as a processing style that is focused 
on discrepancies, contributing to feelings of hopeless-
ness and depression. Another explanation could be that 
experiential alienation toward autobiographical memo-
ries is an epiphenomenon of dissociative symptoms in 
PTSD.
Our finding that people with PTSD experienced their 
nontrauma memories as more vivid than those without 
PTSD was unexpected, especially because these were 
more overgeneral. One explanation could be that mem-
ory overgenerality might reflect another dimension than 
lack of details per se. It is conceivable that event sum-
maries, as in overgeneral remembering, do not necessar-
ily lack visual details as details of several situations could 
still be merged into one “picture.” It is also possible that 
the vividness results from a perceptual processing style 
in people with PTSD that would enhance remembering 
of perceptual details of personal events. Perceptual pro-
cessing has been discussed as a risk factor for PTSD 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This suggestion is supported by 
McKinnon et al. (2014) who found enhanced details (but 
not richness) in both trauma and nontrauma memories 
in PTSD. Another explanation could be that the trauma-
relatedness of these memories leads to an increase in 
arousal, potentially affecting vividness judgments of 
other memories as well. It is noticeable that we did not 
find any valence effect, suggesting that there is no gen-
eral negativity bias for memories in PTSD.
Characteristics of trauma memories in 
PTSD
As expected, participants with PTSD recorded more 
trauma memories than the No- PTSD group, and rated 
these as more frequently recurring. The difference was 
also present in their predictions of what proportion of 
trauma memories they expected to experience, taken prior 
to the diary week. The predicted ratio correlated with the 
actual ratio between trauma and nontrauma memories, 
suggesting that it might be a valid and possibly more infor-
mative measure of memory disturbance in PTSD that intru-
sion frequency (see also Michael et al., 2005).
Furthermore, trauma memories in PTSD were rated as 
more vivid and characterized by a sense of “nowness” 
than trauma memories in the no-PTSD group and non-
trauma memories in the PTSD group. These results are in 
line with studies using retrospective self-reports of trauma 
memory characteristics as well as laboratory-induced 
intrusive trauma memories (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 
2003; Hackmann et al., 2004; Hellawell & Brewin, 2004) 
and concurrent monitoring (Kleim et  al., 2013). The 
“nowness” of trauma memories might point to a lack of 
time perspective or “autonoetic awareness” in the PTSD 
group (Ehlers et al., 2004). “Nowness” of intrusive trauma 
memories has shown to be a better predictor of chronic 
PTSD than intrusion frequency (Michael et al., 2005), and 
this aspect of reexperiencing has been proposed as a 
defining characteristic of intrusions in the current con-
ceptualization of PTSD in the 11th Revision of the Inter-
national Classification of Diseases (Maercker et al., 2013). 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed that “nowness” is a 
sign that those parts of the trauma that are reexperienced 
are poorly elaborated and thus susceptible to direct 
retrieval without context information. People may per-
ceive an imminent threat to their lives when having 
intrusions of particularly distressing moments from the 
trauma as they do not simultaneously access relevant 
context information such as the fact that they have sur-
vived the trauma (see also Brewin et al., 2010, for similar 
suggestions linking these observations to neuroscience 
findings).
Contrary to our expectation, there was only a trend 
(partial η2 = .097 and .101, respectively) for the PTSD 
group to rate their trauma memories to a greater extent 
as landmark events and as related to an important theme 
than those without PTSD, partly supporting Berntsen’s 
(2001) findings. Low power and the assessment with only 
one item may have contributed to the nonsignificant find-
ing. However, the PTSD group rated their trauma memo-
ries as landmark events to a greater extent than their 
nontrauma memories. Thus, there was some support for 
the hypothesis that traumatized people use the trauma as 
reference point when remembering other events from 
their lives (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).
PTSD patients experienced their traumatic event and 
memories as more negative than did the no-PTSD group 
and as more negative than their nontrauma memories, 
even though both groups reported the same types of 
traumas and with no differences in trauma severity. Due 
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to the cross-sectional nature of the study it is not possible 
to distinguish between PTSD as a consequence of a par-
ticularly negative event or the evaluation of the event as 
particularly negative possibly also as a consequence of 
subsequent symptoms.
It is interesting that the groups did not differ in terms 
of intentionality of both their trauma and nontrauma 
memories; however, the PTSD group experienced their 
trauma memories as less intentional than their nontrauma 
memories. Thus, trauma memories may be similarly 
involuntary for individuals after a trauma, yet be judged 
as pathological or predominant in particular by persons 
with PTSD, possibly contributing to negativity ratings. 
Cognitive models of PTSD propose that negative inter-
pretation of symptoms is a maintaining factor for PTSD 
symptoms (i.e., Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
Participants with PTSD also thought longer about their 
trauma memories and tried to push them out of their 
mind to a greater extent than those without PTSD. These 
results are in line with previous results highlighting the 
role of rumination and thought suppression in maintain-
ing PTSD (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Ehring 
et  al., 2008; Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007). The 
PTSD group also reported retrieving more connected 
memories than the no-PTSD group, which could mirror a 
general ruminative style in PTSD as discussed earlier.
Study limitations
The present study was a field study, leading to several 
methodological difficulties. First, it is not possible to 
determine whether participants recorded all memories 
they experienced. Some participants may have found it 
aversive to record unpleasant memories, and others may 
have failed to record fleeting memories of other more 
trivial events. Factors influencing monitoring compliance 
such as motivation or competing mental demands may 
have affected whether or not a particular memory was 
recorded. This may restrict the validity of the findings, 
although it is unlikely that the particular pattern of find-
ings is explained by such biases. Furthermore, the pro-
portion of intrusive trauma memories recorded in the 
diary corresponded well with the participants’ prior esti-
mates. Should the PTSD group have avoided recording 
trauma memories, the present results reflect a conserva-
tive assessment of their frequency.
Second, assessing OGM in the natural environment 
deviates from the standard AMT test setting. There was 
no time limit and no prompting, or usage of standardized 
cues, and participants had not particularly been instructed 
to produce specific memories. Conservatively, our find-
ing of OGM in PTSD can therefore only be interpreted as 
an everyday retrieval pattern rather than a lack of ability 
in retrieving specific memories.
Third, the present study used a cross-sectional, corre-
lational design so that causal conclusions cannot be 
drawn. Prospective longitudinal studies could help eluci-
date the temporal relationship between altered everyday 
memory characteristics and PTSD.
Fourth, the study had a relatively small sample size so 
that unexpected findings that are not in line with the 
previous literature should be treated with caution. Fur-
ther studies are needed to replicate our findings.
Conclusions and Clinical Implications
Overall, this study of participants with clinically signifi-
cant traumas showed several alterations of everyday 
autobiographical memories in people with PTSD. Partici-
pants with PTSD had problems accessing events from 
their lives other than the trauma, even when uninten-
tional memories were considered, and their nontrauma 
memories were mainly related to their trauma. They 
experienced older, fewer, and more general nontrauma 
memories than traumatized people without PTSD. These 
results are of theoretical and clinical interest.
The results indicate that OGM bias is not restricted to 
intentional remembering, which is at odds with current 
theories suggesting that OGM does not apply to uninten-
tional remembering (Williams et al., 2007). The study also 
showed for the first time that OGM bias in unintentional 
remembering is related to posttrauma psychopathology. 
Further research is needed to replicate the results and 
investigate their specificity to PTSD. Theories of autobio-
graphical memory need to explain how the presence of 
symptoms of PTSD, but not trauma alone, is associated 
with profound changes in everyday memory including a 
paucity of nontrauma memories. Although theories of 
PTSD have focused mainly on characteristics of the devel-
opment and maintenance of intrusive trauma memories, 
our results suggest that this approach may be too narrow 
to understand the influence of memory function on PTSD 
symptoms. The value of the characteristics of involuntary 
nontrauma memories observed in this study in predicting 
PTSD warrants further investigation. These may contrib-
ute to symptom development or maintenance by pre-
venting trauma memory contextualization and integration, 
and may therefore be promising targets for intervention. 
The infrequent and overgeneral retrieval of nontrauma 
memories in PTSD may also contribute to the interfer-
ence of the disorder with the patients’ lives. It contributes 
to a changed sense of self, which has been shown to 
maintain PTSD, and may also lead to depression and 
hopelessness (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). The ability to 
retrieve memories of events from our past helps ground-
ing ourselves in relation to time and place, which is a 
necessary condition when trying to act effectively in our 
environment and in respect to future-oriented goals 
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(Pillemer, 2003). Further research should investigate 
whether OGM and paucity of involuntary nontrauma 
memories can be altered with treatment.
Trauma memories in PTSD showed distinct features 
(greater involuntariness, nowness, landmark quality, neg-
ativity, suppression, and dwelling), compared to the no-
PTSD group, suggesting that there are features of trauma 
memories in PTSD that cannot solely be explained by 
having experienced trauma (see also Brewin, 2014). 
These results support existing theories and treatments of 
PTSD that focus on elaborating the moments in memory 
that are involuntarily reexperienced to reduce their now-
ness, and on changing unhelpful responses to memories 
such as suppression and dwelling (e.g., Brewin, 2014; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
It appears plausible that the memory alterations in 
trauma and nontrauma memories interact with each 
other. These considerations suggest that interventions 
that counteract the retrieval difficulties and help PTSD 
patients remember past experiences that are uncon-
nected to the trauma may be helpful. Moradi et al. (2014) 
recently reported positive effects of a memory specificity 
training in PTSD (“MEST”, Raes, Williams & Hermans, 
2009). However, the results remain preliminary as this 
training has not yet been compared to a placebo condi-
tion and only been tested with rather small samples. It is 
heavily based on training the AMT-typical correct 
responses. Our findings suggest that an autobiographical 
memory training could be possibly even more effective 
if it addressed further aspects of autobiographical 
remembering than just overgenerality. A first additional 
target for intervention is to enhance access to nontrauma 
memories by providing retrieval cues. Some empirically 
validated treatments for PTSD include interventions that 
facilitate access to memories of prior, functional aspects 
of their lives (e.g., cognitive therapy for PTSD—Ehlers, 
Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005; narrative 
exposure therapy—Schauer, Neuner, & Elbert, 2011). 
The present findings suggest that access to more recent 
non-trauma-related memories should also be enhanced. 
If present, dysfunctional cognitions about autobiograph-
ical remembering in general can be addressed with cog-
nitive therapy, for example appraisals that the self is 
permanently damaged or lost, that difficulties in memory 
retrieval indicate brain damage, or that allowing the 
traumatic memory might be dangerous (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). Following this, a further target is a reduction in 
suppression and dwelling tendencies, for example with 
mindfulness-based approaches or cognitive behavioral 
techniques.
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